SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.; Biswas, Basudeb; Godfrey, E. Bruce.

This chapter uses a new ecological-economic approach to analyze the role of time in range management in a dynamic and stochastic setting. We first construct a theoretical model of a parcel of rangeland in which time restrictions are used to manage the land. We then show how the dynamic and the stochastic properties of this rangeland can be used to construct two managerial objectives that are ecologically and economically meaningful. Finally, using these two objectives, we discuss an approach to range management in which the manager has two interrelated goals. This manager maximizes the profits from range operations and (s)he also takes steps to move the rangeland away from the least desirable state of existence.

A MODEL OF POTENTIALLY IMMISERIZING UNILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS

Palavras-chave: Land Economics/Use; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22149

A RENEWAL THEORETIC APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD SETTING

Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 1990

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14037

The process of environmental regulation is usually a two-step one. In the first step, a standard for environmental quality is set. Then, in the second step, a regulatory mechanism is put in place to achieve the standard. In this paper I show how renewal theory can be used to set the quality standard optimally.

AN AGENDA FOR THE DESIGN AND STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS

Palavras-chave: Environmental; Regulation; Standard; Renewal; Theory; Environmental Economics and Policy; D81; Q20.

Ano: 1995

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28354

The combination of a general greening of international political debate, and the events of 1992 at the Rio Earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection. While it is recognized that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the means by which the earths fragile environment is most likely to be protected, this recognition has been recent. Hence, there is very little formal research on the design and study of IEAs. As such, in this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of IEAs. Very generally, I propose that we frame the IEA design question as a problem in mechanism design. We will then be able to use, inter alia, the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies...

AN AGENDA FOR THE STUDY OF LAND USE, WILDERNESS DESIGNATION, AND RESOURCE REGULATION IN THE AMERICAN WEST

Palavras-chave: International; Environmental; Agreement; Design; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; D73; D82; L50.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28353

Atemporal and intertemporal use of public lands, the determination of optimal levels of wilderness designation and habitat preservation, and the appropriate regulation of natural resources have all been "hot button" issues in the American West for quite some time now. In this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda which promises to yield interesting and useful new policy insights into these fractious resource issues.

CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMALITY IN A DYNAMIC GAME OF POLLUTION CONTROL I: COMPETITION

Palavras-chave: Land use; Wilderness; Regulation; Research; Agenda; Land Economics/Use; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; B41; Q20; Q25.

Ano: 1995

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28360

I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive industry. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under time consistent policies. Forthcoming in Environmental and Resource Economics

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE EFFECT OF BUDGET BALANCE AND POLLUTION CEILING CONSTRAINTS

Palavras-chave: Environmental; Regulation; Tax; Dynamic; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q25; H32; D62.

Ano: 1995

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28351

I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) with limited financial resources who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various LDCs, but he must deal with such firms through their governments. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction and focus on the properties of the optimal ex post contracts (IEAs), which can be implemented by the SNGA, in turn, in the case where governments and firms in each nation do not collude and then in the case where governments and firms do collude. I find that the monetary transfers necessary to induce optimal behavior by governments and firms are not very sensitive to the...

ENDOGENIZING THE RESERVATION VALUE IN MODELS OF LAND DEVELOPMENT OVER TIME AND UNDER UNCERTAINTY

Palavras-chave: Environmental; Agreement; LDCs; Budget; Ceiling; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Development; D62; D82; Q25.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28347

The notion of a reservation value is a key feature of most contemporary dynamic and stochastic models of land development. It is clear that the magnitude of the reservation value has a fundamental bearing on the decision to develop or preserve land. This notwithstanding, many papers that analyze land development in a dynamic and stochastic setting treat a landowners reservation value as an exogenous variable. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to endogenize the reservation value in the context of a model of land development over time and under uncertainty. Our analysis shows that the optimal reservation value is the solution to a specific maximization problem. In addition, we also show that there exist theoretical circumstances in which the...

GAME MODELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY

Palavras-chave: Land Economics/Use.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28340

In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a game theoretic perspective. We address two broad questions. First, we examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy by a country in a Stackelberg game will make that country worse off. Second, we study the effects of environmental regulation by means of alternate price control instruments in a Stackelberg game where there is transboundary pollution. We find that there are plausible theoretical circumstances in which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy is not a good idea. Further, we show that in choosing between alternate pollution control instruments, national governments typically face a tradeoff between...

INDIVISIBILITY AND DIVISIBILITY IN LAND DEVELOPMENT DECISIONS OVER TIME AND UNDER UNCERTAINTY

Palavras-chave: Environmental; Policy; Open; Economy; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; D62; F13; Q28.

Ano: 1995

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28364

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.; Yoo, Seung Jick.

The quasi-option value (QOV) literature originated by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and by Henry (1974) is largely concerned with the analysis of two-period models of land development. Our paper extends this literature by analyzing two scenarios in which the decision to develop land is made in a multi-period and stochastic framework. In the first scenario, the development decision is indivisible. In contrast, in the second scenario, the development decision is divisible. Specifically, we study the properties of the indivisible development decision when there is a time constraint on when land is to be developed. We then analyze the ways in which the divisible land development decision depends on the extent of a landowner's landholding and on the number of...

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND BIOLOGICAL INVASIONS: A QUEUING THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE PREVENTION PROBLEM

Palavras-chave: Land Economics/Use.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20278

Beladi, Hamid; Batabyal, Amitrajeet A..

We propose and develop a new framework for studying the problem of preventing biological invasions caused by ships transporting internationally traded goods between countries and continents. In particular, we apply the methods of queuing theory to analyze the problem of preventing a biological invasion from a long run perspective. First, we characterize two simple regulatory regimes as two different kinds of queues. Second, we show how to pose a publically owned port manager's decision problem as an optimization problem using queuing theoretic techniques. Third, we compare and contrast the optimality conditions emanating from our analysis of the M/M/I/U and the M/M/I/I inspection regimes. We conclude by discussing possible extensions to our basic models.

MODELING ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS ON TROPICAL FOREST MANAGEMENT: COMMENT

Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19912

Barrett, Christopher B.; Batabyal, Amitrajeet A..

We comment on four aspects of Albers' [1] model of ecological constraints on tropical forest management. Albers structures her model in a highly asymmetric manner, with strong, uniform biases against development and in favor of preservation. Despite Albers' repeated claims that her model is "complete" and that it has significant implications for tropical forest management, we contend instead that the results of a truly general, empirically defensible model are inherently ambiguous. Spatial and intertemporal dimensions clearly matter, but they do not point as neatly in favor of preservation as Albers would have us believe. Note: Forthcoming in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

On Container Versus Time Based Inspection Policies in Invasive Species Management

Palavras-chave: Forest; Interdependence; Irreversibility; Management; Uncertainty; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D81; Q15; Q23.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28371

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.; Nijkamp, Peter.

We study the problem of precluding biological invasions caused by ships transporting internationally traded goods in containers between different regions of the world. Using the long run expected net cost (LRENC) of inspections as the apposite managerial objective, we address the following important question: Given that inspection is a cyclical activity, is the LRENC lower when a port manager's inspector inspects cargo upon the arrival of a specified number of containers (container policy) or is this LRENC lower when this inspector inspects cargo at fixed points in time (temporal policy)? We construct a queuing theoretic model and show that in an inspection cycle, irrespective of whether the inspection policy choice is made on the basis of an explicit...

ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE MANAGEMENT OF A STOCHASTICALLY DEVELOPING FOREST

Palavras-chave: Public Economics.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19356

In this paper I focus on some important biological aspects of the forest management problem. I model a stochastically developing forest as a multidimensional, continuous-time Markov chain. Next, I pose three questions concerning the long-run characteristics of a stationary forest, the stochastic process followed by dying species, and the age of an arbitrary species in the forest. I then (a) characterize a stationary forest probabilistically, (b) describe the stochastic process governing the demise of species in this forest, and (c) provide a method for determining the age of an arbitrary species in the forest. Finally, I discuss the forest management implications of the issues raised in this paper. Note: Published in Ecological Modelling 89(1-3,...

ON THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE STOCKING RATE AND TIME IN RANGE MANAGEMENT

Palavras-chave: Forest; Management; Continuous-time Markov chain; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28361

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.; Biswas, Basudeb; Godfrey, E. Bruce.

A long standing question in range management concerns the relative importance of the stocking rate versus the length of time during which animals graze a particular rangeland. We address this question by analyzing the problem faced by a private rancher who wishes to minimize the long run expected net unit cost (LRENC) from range operations by choosing either the stocking rate or the length of time during which his animals graze his rangeland. We construct a renewal-theoretic model and show that, in general, this rancher's LRENC with an optimally chosen stocking rate is lower than his LRENC with an optimally chosen grazing cycle length.

RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS AND ANOMALIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE PATTERNS: A STUDY OF INDIA, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.A.

Palavras-chave: Livestock Production/Industries.

Ano: 2001

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20744

THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION ON LAND DEVELOPMENT: A DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC ANALYSIS

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade.

Ano: 1987

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28896

In a two-period model, economists such as K.J. Arrow, A.C. Fisher, and C. Henry, have shown that when development is both indivisible and irreversible, a developer who ignores the possibility of obtaining new information about the outcome of such development will invariably underestimate the benefits of preservation and hence favor development. In this note, I extend the AFH analysis in two directions. I model the land development problem in a dynamic framework, explicitly specifying an information production function. In such a setting, I then ask and answer the question concerning when development should take place. Forthcoming in Journal of Environmental Management

THE QUEUING THEORETIC APPROACH TO GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT

Palavras-chave: Development; Dynamic; Information; Uncertainty; Land Economics/Use; D82; Q20.

Ano: 1995

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28356

In this paper I propose and develop a new framework for modeling groundwater management issues. Specifically, I apply the methods of queuing theoryfor the first time, to the best of my knowledgeto model a groundwater management problem from a long-run perspective. I characterize two simple management regimes as two different kinds of queues and then show how to pose a manager's decision problem as an optimization problem using queuing theoretic techniques. I solve for certain fundamental quantities, such as the expected system size, and then discuss the economic meaning and relevance of the queuing concepts being used. I close by discussing possible extensions to my basic models. Published in Ecological Modelling 85 (2-3, 1996):219-27.